We provide a method for deciding the insecurity of cryptographic 
Introduction
Cryptographic protocols have been designed for handling secure electronic communications. Verification tools based on formal methods (e.g. model checking) have been quite successful in discovering new flaws in well-known security protocols [14, 18, 22, 3, 6] .
While most formal analysis of security protocols abstracts from low-level properties, i.e., certain algebraic properties of encryption, such as the multiplicativity of RSA or the properties induced by chaining methods for block ciphers, many real attacks and protocol weaknesses rely on these properties. A typical example was provided by Ryan and Schneider [21] where they give a simple attack on Bull's recursive authentication protocol: the protocol is used to distribute a connected chain of keys linking all the nodes from originator to the server, but if one key is compromised the others can be compromised too thanks to the property of XOR. Conversely, if XOR is considered £ This work was partially supported by PROCOPE and IST AVISPA as a free operator then, as shown by L. Paulson using the Isabelle prover [19] , the protocol is secure.
Recently, several procedures have been proposed to decide insecurity of cryptographic protocols w.r.t. a finite number of protocol sessions [2, 4, 11, 20, 17, 13] . Moreover, some special cases for an unbounded number of sessions have been studied [9, 10, 7, 1] . All these results assume encryption to be perfect (perfect encryption assumption): One needs a decryption key to extract the plaintext from the ciphertext, and also, a ciphertext can be generated only with the appropriate key and message (no collision). Only very few works on formal analysis have relaxed this assumption. In [16, 12] , unification algorithms are designed for handling properties of Diffie-Hellman cryptographic systems.
In this paper, we generalize the decidability result of [20] , stating that insecurity for finitely many protocol sessions is in NP, to the case where messages may contain the XOR operator and where the Dolev-Yao intruder is extended by the ability to compose messages with the XOR operator. More precisely, we give a linear bound on the size of messages exchanged in minimal attacks and present an NP procedure for deciding insecurity with XOR. This extension is non-trivial due to the complex interaction of the XOR properties and the standard Dolev-Yao intruder rules. The technical problems raised by the equational laws are somewhat related to those encountered in semantic unification.
To prove our result, we have extended the Dolev-Yao intruder with so-called oracle rules, i.e., deduction rules that satisfy certain conditions. In this general framework we show that insecurity is decidable in NP. Now, the results for XOR are obtained by proving that the XOR rules satisfy the conditions on oracle rules.
Our framework is general enough to also handle other algebraic properties. More specifically, we show that the Dolev-Yao intruder equipped with the ability to exploit prefix properties of encryption algorithms based on cipherblock-chaining (CBC) falls into our framework as well.
To the best of our knowledge, the results presented here are the first, besides the ones by Comon and Shmatikov [8] also presented in these proceedings, that go beyond the perfect encryption assumption. We briefly compare our work with [8] : As an immediate consequence of our proof, the problem of checking whether a message can be derived by an intruder in presence of the XOR operator -this problem is called ground reachability in [8] -is in PTIME. In [8] , this problem is shown to be in NP both for the case of XOR and abelian groups. As for the general insecurity problem, we show NP-completeness based on a theorem that ensures the existence of attacks of linear size. Comon and Shmatikov present a decision procedure with a higher complexity. This procedure is based on constraint solving techniques. However, they consider a more general class of protocol rules. In Section 3.2, we argue that these more general rules are rather unrealistic. Finally, we believe that our framework is quite general in the sense that different intruders with different deduction capabilities can be captured such as those for exploiting properties of encryption based on block ciphers (see Section 7).
Structure of the paper. In the following section, we provide an example illustrating the role of XOR in attacks. We then, in Section 3, introduce our protocol and intruder model. In particular, this section contains the definition of the oracle rules. The decidability result for the general framework is presented in Section 4, including the description of the NP decision algorithm. Proof sketches are provided in Section 5 and 6. Then, in Section 7, XOR rules and prefix rules are introduced and it is shown that these rules are oracle rules, which implies the mentioned complexity results. The missing proofs and an application of prefix rules can be found in [5] .
A Motivating Example
We illustrate that when taking the algebraic properties of XOR into account, new attacks can occur. As an example, we use a variant of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Protocol [15] , i.e., the public-key Needham-Schroeder Procotol with Lowe's fix, where in some place, instead of concatenation XOR is used. Using common notation, the protocol is given as follows:
: AE Ô Ã If XOR is interpreted as free symbol, such as pairing, then according to [15] this protocol is secure. In particular, the intruder is not able to get hold of AE . However, if the algebraic properties of XOR are taken into account, the following attack is possible, which is a variant of the original attack on the Needham-Schroeder Protocol and which allows the intruder Á to obtain AE . In this attack, two sessions run interleaved where the steps of the second session are marked with ¼ . In the first session, talks to the intruder Á, and in the second session Á, purporting to be , talks to . We emphasize that in this attack Á generates new messages by applying the XOR operator and uses that XOR´AE Á µ XOR XOR´AE Á µ.
1.
The Protocol and Intruder Model
The protocol and intruder model we describe here extend standard models for the (automatic) analysis of security protocols [2, 10, 20, 17] in two respects. First, messages can be build using the XOR operator, which is not allowed in most other protocol models. Second, in addition to the standard Dolev-Yao rewrite rules, the intruder is equipped with the mentioned oracle rules. In what follows, we provide a formal definition of our model by defining terms, messages, protocols, the intruder, and attacks.
Terms and Messages
First, recall that a finite multiset over a set Ë is a function Å from Ë to ÁAE with finite domain. We use the common set notation to define multisets. We define the size of a term and a set of terms basically as the size of the representation as a DAG. That is, the (DAG) size Ø ( ) of a term Ø (a set of terms ) is the cardinality of the set Ë´Øµ (Ë´ µ). Note that ¡ applied to a set of terms will always denote the DAG size of the set rather than its cardinality.
The XOR operator is considered to be commutative, associative, nilpotent, and ¼ is the unit element. According to these properties, the normal form of a term is defined as the result of the normalization function ÔÕ Ø ÖÑ Ø ÖÑ .
Before providing the formal definition of this function, we illustrate it by some examples: If
Formally, the normalization function is recursively defined as follows:
For an atom or a variable , Ô Õ For a non-standard term Ø, define Å to be the multiset of factors of Ø in normalized form, i.e., 
Protocols
The following definition is explained below. Given a protocol È , in the following we will assume that is the set of constants occurring in È . We define Ë´È µ Ë ¾Á´Ê Ë µµ to be the set of subterms of È , È Ë´È µ to be the (DAG) size of È and Î Î´È µ to be the set of variables occurring in È .
Definition 1 A protocol rule is of the form
Intuitively, when executing a rule Ê µ Ë and on receiving a (normalized) message Ñ in a protocol run, it is first checked whether Ñ and Ê match, i.e., whether there exists a ground substitution such that Ñ XOR Ê . If so, Ô Ë Õ is returned as output. We always assume that the messages exchanged between principals (and the intruder) are normalized -therefore, Ñ is assumed to be normalized and the output of the above rule is not Ë but Ô Ë Õ . This is because principals and the intruder cannot distinguish between equivalent terms, and therefore, they may only work on normalized terms (representing the corresponding equivalence class of terms). Finally, we note that since the different protocol rules may share variables, some of the variables in Ê and Ë may be bounded already by substitutions obtained from applications of previous protocol rules. We are not actually interested in a normal execution of a protocol but rather in attacks on a protocol. This is the reason why the definition of a protocol contains the initial intruder knowledge. Attacks are formally defined in Section 3.3. Condition 1. , in the above definition is not a real restriction since due to Lemma 1, the transformation performed by a protocol rule and its normalized variant coincide. Condition 2. guarantees that when with Ë an output is produced, all variables in Ë are "bounded" already.
Otherwise, the output of a protocol rule would be arbitrary, since unbounded variables could be mapped to any message. Condition 3. guarantees that the bounding of variables is deterministic. 
etc. In other words, a principal must guess a substitution. With Condition 3. we avoid this. We point out that in [8] no restrictions on protocol rules are put, and thus, also these rather unrealistic rules are allowed. The protocol informally described in Section 2 can formally be stated as follows: 
The Intruder Model and Attacks
Our intruder model follows the Dolev-Yao intruder [9] . That is, the intruder has complete control over the network and he can derive new messages from his initial knowledge and the messages received from honest principals during protocol runs. To derive a new message, the intruder can compose and decompose, encrypt and decrypt messages, in case he knows the key. What distinguishes the intruder we consider here from the standard Dolev-Yao intruder, is that we will equip the intruder with guess rules, which provide him with additional capabilities of deriving messages. In Section 3.4, we consider classes of guess rules with certain properties, so-called oracle rules. As mentioned, in Section 7 we will look at two different instances of these oracle rules, namely XOR and prefix rules. messages, Ã is an element of Ã, and is a finite set of messages (considered as multiset).
We emphasize that the notion of intruder rule will always refer to the rules listed in Table 1 . For now, there may be any set of guess rules of the kind shown in Table 1 , later we will consider certain classes of guess rules, namely oracle rules.
The intruder rules are denoted as shown in Table 1 .
With Ä Ó ´ µ and Ä Ó ´ µ we denote (finite or infinite) sets of guess rules. For uniformity, we therefore consider
as singletons. Note that, even if there are no guess rules, the number of decomposition and composition rules is always infinite since there are infinitely many messages . We further group the intruder rules as follows. In the following, Ø ranges over all messages.
Ä ´Øµ Ä Ô½´Ø µ Ä Ô¾´Ø µ Ä ´Øµ Ä × ´Øµ for every message Ø. In case, for instance, Ä Ô½´Ø µ is not defined, i.e., the head symbol of Ø is not a pair, then Ä Ô½´Ø µ
; analogously for the other rule sets,
Ä ´Øµ is the set of all decomposition Ø-rules in Table 1, i.e., all Ø-rule in the left column of the table, Ä Ë Ø Ä ´Øµ, Ä ´Øµ is the set of all composition Ø-rules in Table 1 .
Note that Ä denotes the (infinite) set of all intruder rules we consider here. The set of messages the intruder can derive from a (finite) set of messages is:
From the definition of intruder rules in Table 1 it immediately follows:
Lemma 2 If is a normalized set of messages, then
ÓÖ ´ µ is normalized. The lemma says that if an intruder only sees normalized messages, then he only creates normalized messages. Intruders should be modeled in such a way that they cannot distinguish between equivalent messages since if one thinks of, for instance, the message XOR´ µ, which is equivalent to , as a bit string obtained by "XORing" the bit strings , , and , then this bit string is simply . Therefore, in what follows we always assume that the intruder's knowledge consists of a set of normalized messages, where every single normalized message in this set can be seen as a representative of its equivalence class.
We are now prepared to define attacks. In an attack on a protocol È, the intruder (nondeterministically) chooses some execution order for È and then tries to produce input messages for the protocol rules. These input messages are derived from the intruder's initial knowledge and the output messages produced by executing the protocol rules. The aim of the intruder is to derive the message × Ö Ø. If different sessions of a protocol running interleaved shall be analysed, then these sessions must be encoded into the protocol È. This is the standard approach when protocols are analysed w.r.t. a bounded number of sessions, see, for instance, [20] . 
The decision problem we are interested in is the following set of protocols:
INSECURE
È there exists an attack on È
Oracle Rules
Oracle rules are guess rules which satisfy certain conditions. To define these rules, we first need some new notions. We also need well formed derivations which are derivations where every message generated by an intermediate step either occurs in the goal or in the initial set of messages. with subterm of and normalized. with normalized and such that every proper subterm of is a subterm of . The NP decision procedure is given in Figure 1 . Clearly, the procedure is sound. To show completeness, one has to prove that if there exists an attack´ µ on È , then there is one with the size of bounded as in step 2. of the procedure. This bound is established in Section 6, Theorem 3. In Section 5, we show that step 3. and 4. in the procedure can be carried out in polynomial time. More precisely, we show that the following problem, henceforth called derivation problem, can be solved in polynomial time in the (DAG) size of the input:
Definition 3 Let
where is a finite set of messages and Ø is a message, both given as DAGs (see Theorem 2). In the procedure, is the set Ô Ë Ë ¼ Õ for some ¾ ½ and Ø is Ô Ê Õ or × Ö Ø. From Corollary 1, it follows that Ø ¡ È , and thus, the procedure depicted in Figure 1 is in fact an NP decision procedure.
Deciding the Derivation Problem
We show: 
Linear Bounds on Attacks
We now show that the size of an attack can be bounded as required in step 2. in Figure 1 .
In what follows, we assume that Ä Ó is a set of oracle rules. If Ø ¾ ÓÖ ´ µ, we denote by Ø´ µ a well formed derivation from with goal Ø (chosen arbitrarily among the possible ones). Note that there always exists such a derivation since the definition of oracle rules ensures that a well formed derivation exists iff a derivation exists.
Clearly, if there is an attack, there is a normal attack. Note, however, normal attacks are not necessarily uniquely determined.
In Lemma 8 we prove, using Lemma 3 to 7, that normal attacks can always be constructed by linking subterms that are initially occurring in the problem specification. This will allow us to bound the size of attacks as desired (Theorem 3 and Corollary 1). 
1. Guess an execution order for È . Let be the size of . Let Ê Ê ¼ ½´ µ and Ë Ë ¼ ½´ µ for ¾ ½ 2. Guess a normalized ground substitution such that ´Üµ Ò for all Ü ¾ Î .
5. If each check is successful, then answer "yes", and otherwise, "no". Proof. Let Thus, the last step of ¼ is a composition rule. £
The subsequent lemma will allow us to replace certain subterms occurring in a substitution of an attack by smaller terms. Note that from the assumption made in this lemma it follows that × can be derived from such that the last rule is a composition rule. This allows to replace × by a smaller term since when deriving Ø, decomposing × will not be necessary. The next lemma will be used to remove one application of the normalization function. 
Lemma 7 Let be a normalized ground substitution
The main lemma, which shows that a substitution of a normal attack can be build up from subterms of terms occurring in È , is proved next. Proof. Assume that (*): For every Ø, Ø Ú Ú Ü implies Ø ¾ Ë´È µ. We will lead this to a contradiction. Since Ë´È µ, we have Ú Ü ¾ , and since Ú Ü is a factor of ´Üµ, Ú Ü is standard. By Lemma 3 and (*), there exists such that Ú Ü ¾ Ë´ÔÊ Õ µ. Let AE Ü be minimal among the possible . If Ú Ü ¾ Ë´ÔË Õ µ for some , (*) implies that there exists Ý ¾ Î´Ë µ with Ú Ü ¾ Ë´ ´Ýµµ. Then, by Definition 1, (2) 
Extending the Dolev-Yao Intruder by Different Oracle Rules
We extend the ability of the standard Dolev-Yao intruder beyond the perfect encryption hypothesis by considering two specific sets of oracle rules. The first set are the XOR rules which allow the intruder to make use of the XOR operator. We then consider, what we call, prefix rules which allow the intruder to exploit certain properties of encryption based on block ciphers.
XOR Rules
The XOR rules allow the intruder to sum several messages with the XOR operator. The result of this sum is being normalized.
Definition 7
We define Ä Ó Ä Ó Ä Ó to be the set of 
We call the intruder using the rules Ä Ó Ä Ä the XOR intruder.
Note that the rules in Ä Ó are in fact decomposition guess Therefore, we can restrict the intruder to work only on normalized messages and to produce only normalized messages.
Before showing that the XOR rules are oracle rules, we illustrate that the XOR intruder can perform the attack informally described in Section 2.
Formally, the protocol underlying the attack is described as follows: The set of atoms is On the other hand, when using these rules,´ µ with the execution order Also, we can show that XOR rules can be applied in polynomial time. As an immediate consequence of Theorem 1 we obtain that INSECURE with XOR rules is in NP. NP-hardness can be obtained as in [20] . Altogether this yields:
Theorem 4 INSECURE w.r.t. the XOR intruder is an NPcomplete problem.

Together with Proposition 3, Theorem 2 implies:
Theorem 5 For the XOR intruder, the problem DERIVE is in PTIME.
In [8] , this problem is called ground reachability problem and is shown to be in NP.
Prefix Rules
As another instance of oracles rules, we consider what we call prefix rules. These rules allow the intruder to exploit certain properties of block encryption algorithms, based for example on cipher block chaining (CBC). Using Theorem 1, again we can show that INSECURE is an NPcomplete problem. In [5] an example that illustrates the additional power of the intruder is provided.
Throughout this section, we assume that terms do not contain the XOR operator and that the normalization function Ô ¡ Õ is the identity function. It is easy to verify that Theorem 1 also holds in this simplified setting. We can prove that these prefix rules are oracle rules that can be checked in polynomial time and then conclude that INSECURE for an intruder equipped with prefix rules is NPcomplete by Theorem 1. With Theorem 2 we obtain: Theorem 7 For the prefix intruder, the problem DERIVE is in PTIME. 
Conclusion
We have shown that when extending the standard DolevYao intruder by rules for XORing messages the protocol insecurity problem for a finite number of sessions remains NP-complete. This is the first tight complexity bound given for the insecurity problem without the perfect encryption assumption. Here we have only considered insecurity as failure of secrecy. However, we believe that our result holds also for other properties that can be reduced to reachability problems in our model, such as authentification. Future work includes applying our approach to different intruder rules and to algebraic laws such as the ones relying on RSA and Diffie-Hellman encryption techniques.
